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THERE’S SOMETHING IN THE WATER: HOW APATHETIC
STATE OFFICIALS LET THE PEOPLE OF
FLINT, MICHIGAN DOWN
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2015, a rash appeared on Lee-Anne Walters’ chil-
dren due to bathing in water drawn from the Flint River.1  The fam-
ily first began to avoid ingesting the water almost four months prior
due to its abnormal qualities—a harsh brown tint and unsettling
odors that could not be ignored.2  After an inspection, the Michi-
gan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) concluded that
although there were high levels of lead in the Walters’ water, the
levels were due to the in-house plumbing, despite Lee-Anne’s insis-
tence that her house only had plastic plumbing.3
After unsuccessful follow-ups with MDEQ and the continued
presence of visibly contaminated household water, Ms. Walters
sought relief from a higher authority.4  She contacted the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) and researchers at the Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) who each
conducted their own investigations of her home.5  Results of three
subsequent tests of the home’s lead levels were so abnormally high
they exceeded the capability of the tests’ measurements of levels
over 3.3 mg/dL.6  One preliminary memo penned by EPA em-
ployee Miguel Del Toral proved almost prophetic for the remain-
der of 2015: it laid out grave concerns regarding the city’s water
1. See Memorandum from Miguel A. Del Toral, Regulations Manager, Ground
Water and Drinking Water Branch, EPA, to Thomas Poy, Chief, Ground Water and
Drinking Water Branch, EPA (June 24, 2015), http://flintwaterstudy.org/wp-con
tent-uploads/2015/11/Miguels-Memo.pdf (describing timeline of Flint Water
crisis).
2. See id. (noting that Ms. Walters’ family ceased to ingest Flint water in No-
vember 2014).
3. See id. (confirming Ms. Walters’ use of plastic plumbing).
4. See Anurag Mantha & Siddhartha Roy, Hazardous Waste-Levels of Lead Found
in a Flint Household’s Water, FLINTWATERSTUDY.ORG (Aug. 24, 2015), http://flint
waterstudy.org/2015/08/hazardous-waste-levels-of-lead-found-in-a-flint-house-
holds-water/ (noting Ms. Walters’ attempts to determine source of water
problems).
5. See id. (detailing Virginia Tech’s independent investigation of Ms. Walters’
home).
6. See Del Toral, supra note 1, at 3 (describing abnormally high test results).
(57)
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supply, which would be marginalized or ignored entirely by various
officials from the State of Michigan.7
The state’s habit of denying first and asking questions later in-
cluded events other than individual instances of lead exposure like
Ms. Walters’.8  Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, director of the pediatric
residency program at Hurley Medical Center, announced prelimi-
nary findings in September 2015, that children’s lead levels had cat-
egorically increased in Flint since the city began drawing its water
from the Flint River.9  Her results showed that in most areas chil-
dren’s lead levels doubled, and in some instances even tripled in
size.10  The state dismissed the findings with such callous directness,
Dr. Hanna-Attisha even questioned her own concrete evidence:
“You know, you check and you double-check, and you know your
research is right.  The numbers didn’t lie, but when the state is tell-
ing you you’re wrong, it’s hard not to second-guess yourself.”11
Any presence of lead in children’s blood is considered to be
unhealthy.12  The Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) now considers children to have elevated levels of lead in
their blood if the amount is five μg/dL or greater.13  Children with
elevated lead levels are at risk for damage to the brain and nervous
system, slowed growth and development, as well as learning and be-
havior difficulties.14  Additionally, adults with elevated lead levels
face complications with “high blood pressure, . . . abdominal pain,
7. See Julie Bosman, Monica Davy & Mitch Smith, As Water Problems Grew, Offi-
cials Belittled Complaints from Flint, N.Y. TIMES A1 (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/01/21/us/flint-michigan-lead-water-crisis.html (noting state’s
poor response to Del Toral’s early warning).
8. See Flint Water Advisory Task Force, Final Report, 16-21 (2016), https://www
.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/FWATF_FINAL_REPORT_21March2016_5178
05_7.pdf (cataloging instances in which MDEQ’s responses to Flint’s Water Crisis
were belligerent and ineffective).
9. See Dr. Sanjay Gupta, Ben Tinker & Tim Hume, ‘Our Mouths Were Ajar’:
Doctor’s Fight to Expose Flint’s Water Crisis, CNN (Jan. 22, 2016, 8:25 AM), http://www
.cnn.com/2016/01/21/health/flint-water-mona-hanna-attish/ (reporting on Dr.
Hanna-Attisha’s research findings).
10. See id. (describing severity of lead poisoning in Flint after switching water
sources).
11. Id. (noting state’s dismissive and recalcitrant response).
12. See What Do Parents Need to Know to Protect Their Children?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/acclpp/blood_lead_
levels.htm (last updated May 17, 2017) (providing health information on lead
blood levels).
13. See id. (identifying level at which lead in children become dangerous to
children’s health and development).  The CDC previously identified the level at
which health was threatened as ten μg/dL or greater. Id.
14. Id. (detailing health risks associated with elevated levels of lead in chil-
dren); see also Lead Poisoning: Symptoms and Causes, MAYO CLINIC (Dec. 6, 2016),
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/lead-poisoning/symptoms-
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. . . [and] mood disorders,” as well as various adverse effects for
pregnant women.15
The Flint Water Crisis is now infamous for misconduct on be-
half of the Michigan officials responsible for monitoring water qual-
ity, which ultimately endangered the health of Flint’s highly
impoverished population.16  Part II of this Comment will chronicle
the decisions responsible for turning to the Flint River as a water
source and the complications that ensued from switching.17  Part III
will explain the current regulatory requirements pertaining to lead
in drinking water, specifically the EPA’s Lead and Copper Rule.18
Part IV will identify the ways in which various government officials -
including local, state, and federal – failed to enforce the law and
protect the people of Flint.19  Part V will explore other cities in
which similar crises have occurred, as well as discuss solutions and
preemptive measures to strengthen preventative strategies for safe
drinking water.20
II. SAFE DRINKING WATER IS NOT IN THE BUDGET
THIS YEAR, FOLKS
In 2011, a financial disaster mired the city of Flint, Michigan.21
Following a government-issued state of emergency in the city due to
its finances, Governor Rick Snyder announced his decision to place
the city under state control for the second time since 2002.22
Among other measures to mitigate Flint’s financial woes, Michael
causes/dxc-20275054 (identifying symptoms of lead poisoning in children and
newborns).
15. See MAYO CLINIC, supra note 14 (explaining adults also face severe health
complications due to lead exposure).
16. See Michael Wines & John Schwartz, Unsafe Lead Levels in Tap Water Not
Limited to Flint, N.Y. TIMES A1 (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/
09/us/regulatory-gaps-leave-unsafe-lead-levels-in-water-nationwide.html?_r=0
(drawing on Flint Water Crisis’ notoriety to discuss broader issue of lead exposure
nationally).
17. For a discussion of the timeline of events leading to the national outcry
over the Flint Water Crisis, see infra notes 21-54 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the regulatory scheme under which the Flint Water
Crisis occurred, see infra notes 55-94 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the failure of local, state, and federal officials charged
with regulating lead levels, see infra notes 95-152 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of other examples of national lead exposure instances,
see infra notes 153-192 and accompanying text.
21. See Kristin Longley, Emergency Manager Michael Brown Appointed to Lead Flint
Through Second State Takeover, MLIVE (Nov. 29, 2011, 7:34 PM), http://www.mlive
.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2011/11/emergency_manager_michael_brow.html
(describing financial emergency in Flint and state’s actions).
22. See id. (noting Flint’s history with state receivership).
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Brown, Flint’s first of four emergency managers, drastically raised
the water and sewer rates several times, increasing some citizens’
monthly water bills by twenty-five percent.23  These price hikes
harmed Flint’s already financially fragile and historically under-
served population: the median household annual income in Flint is
$24,679, and approximately forty-one percent of the city’s majority
African-American residents live below the poverty line.24  During
these price hikes, the city purchased its water from the Detroit
Water and Sewage Department (DWSD), as it had for decades prior
to switching its supply source.25  In 2013, however, both the Flint
City Council and the State Treasurer approved a decision to join
the new Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA), which was building its
own direct pipeline from Lake Huron to Genessee, Lapeer, and
Sanilac Counties.26  Flint required a temporary water source during
the interim, however, and the city leaders remained concerned with
the steep costs of purchasing from DWSD.27  To avoid these costs,
the city turned to using the Flint River as a temporary water source
until the KWA pipeline could be completed.28
In April 2014, Flint officially cut off access to water from
DWSD.29  Investigations later revealed that the switch occurred
against the advice of Mike Glasgow, Flint’s own water quality super-
23. See Kristin Longley, New Garbage Fee, Water Rate Hike Increase Burden on
Greater Number of Flint Residents, MLIVE (Apr. 29, 2012, 7:50 AM), http://www.mlive
.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2012/04/flint_fee_increases_hit_workin.html (des-
cribing impact of new policies on community).
24. See Quickfacts Flint City, Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census
.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/2629000 (last visited Nov. 20, 2017) (outlining
economic statistics of Flint residents).
25. See Dominic Adams, City Switch to Flint River Water Slated to Happen Friday,
MLIVE (Apr. 24, 2014, 5:50 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/
2014/04/hold_switch_to_flint_river_wat.html (noting Flint’s history of purchasing
water from DWSD).
26. See Dominic Adams, Flint City Council Approves Resolution to Buy Water from
Karegnondi, State Approval Still Needed, MLIVE (Mar. 25, 2013, 10:45 PM), http://
www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/03/flint_city_council_approves_re
.html (reporting on economic drives for change in water source).
27. See Ron Fonger, Detroit Gives Notice: It’s Terminating Water Contract Covering
Flint, Genesee County in One Year, MLIVE (Apr. 19, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://www.mlive
.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/04/detroit_gives_notice_its_termi.html (describ-
ing ter-mination of water contract with DWSD).
28. See Dominic Adams, Flint River Now an Option for Drinking Water Following
Detroit’s Termination of Contract, MLIVE (July 23, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.mlive
.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/07/city_readying_water_plant_to_t.html (re-
marking on past reluctance to use Flint River as drinking water source).
29. See Paul Egan, Todd Spangler & Kristen Jordan Shamus, E-mails: Flint
Water Plant was Rushed into Operation, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 12, 2016, 4:18 PM),
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/02/
12/e-mails-flint-water-plant-rushed-into-operation/80300220/ (accusing state offi-
cials of ignoring warning signs).
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visor, who said the officials making the decision “seem[ed] to have
their own agenda.”30  Residents began complaining about the
water’s taste, odor, and appearance in the months that followed.31
In August and September of 2014, the city issued two water boil
advisories due to the presence of fecal and total coliform bacteria.32
In response to these incidents, Flint began using increased amounts
of chemicals to prevent any further bacterial infections.33
Less than a month later, the General Motors (GM) Plant
ceased using water from the Flint River due to suspicions that the
amount of chemicals in the water was causing erosion of engine
parts at their factory.34  Quelling public response to this, the district
engineer for MDEQ reiterated that although the city’s usage of
chlorine was higher than usual standards, the chloride levels were
“easily within public health guidelines.”35  Around the same time in
October, members of the Governor’s legal counsel recommended
switching back to “the Detroit system as a stopgap ASAP before this
thing gets too far out of control.”36 The state viewed the cost impli-
cations of the change as too great to actually consider the sugges-
30. Id. (noting switch to Flint River in April was against advice of water quality
supervisor).
31. See Ron Fonger, City Adding More Lime to Flint River Water as Resident Com-
plaints Pour In, MLIVE (June 12, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/
flint/index.ssf/2014/06/treated_flint_river_water_meet.html (commenting on cit-
izens’ com-plaints regarding water quality and odor).
32. See Amanda Emery, Flint Issues Boil Water Notice for Portion of West Side of
City, MLIVE (Aug. 16, 2014, 10:14 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index
.ssf/2014/08/flint_issues_boil_water_notice.html (reporting on boil water advisory
due to bacteria in water supply); Ron Fonger, Flint Issues Boil Water Advisory for
Section of the City After Positive Test for Total Coliform Bacteria, MLIVE (Sept. 5, 2014,
6:56 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2014/09/flint_issues_boil
_water_adviso.html (reporting on subsequent water boil advisories).  Water boil
advisories are issued to indicate harmful bacteria present in the water supply, and
direct consumers to boil their water before washing or consuming it in an attempt
to kill bacteria in the water. Id.
33. Fonger, supra note 32 (noting remedial measures taken, including height-
ened levels of chlorine being added to water supply).  City officials also stated their
intention to “flush the [water] system in the boil advisory area . . . .” Id.
34. See Ron Fonger, General Motors Shutting Off Flint River Water at Engine Plant
Over Corrosion Worries, MLIVE (Oct. 13, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://www.mlive.com/
news/flint/index.ssf/2014/10/general_motors_wont_use_flint.html (describing
factory’s decision not to use Flint water due to corrosive qualities).
35. See id. (reporting on MDEQ’s comments on chemical levels in water
supply).
36. See Matthew Dolan & Paul Egan, Top Snyder Aides Urged Going Back to Detroit
Water, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 26, 2016, 12:04 AM), http://www.freep.com/
story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/02/26/flint-water-crisis-snyder-
detroit/80926138/ (revealing intergovernmental opinions expressing that Flint
River water should have been cut off).
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tion, however, and Flint’s second emergency manager, Darnell
Earley, ultimately rejected the proposal.37
Over the next year, state officials repeatedly downplayed the
significance of the Flint citizens’ persistent complaints about the
water’s unseemly qualities.38  January 2015 began with an an-
nouncement from the city that the water system contained signifi-
cant amounts of disinfection byproducts, exceeding the maximum
contaminant level (MCL), and violating the Safe Drinking Water
Act.39  This led to dwindling confidence in the water system by
Flint’s citizens and eventually to citizens confronting officials with
dirty water bottles at public meetings, with Lee-Anne Walters at the
front of the line.40  Around the end of the month, the state actively
avoided commenting on the water supply, even internally sug-
gesting not “to say publicly that the water in Flint is safe until we get
the results of some county health department traceback work on
[forty-two] cases of Legionnaires disease in Genesee County since
last May.”41
Legionnaire’s Disease is similar to pneumonia, and includes
symptoms such as fever, cough, shortness of breath, muscle aches,
and headaches.42  The Legionella bacteria, which occurs naturally in
freshwater environments and multiplies best in warm water, creates
health concerns such as Legionnaire’s when spread through
human-made water systems.43  Eighty-seven cases of Legionnaires’
37. See id. (stating state’s financially motivated reasons for continued Flint
River use).
38. See Bosman, Davey & Smith, supra note 7 (characterizing state response as
belittling and dismissive).
39. See Ron Fonger, City Warns of Potential Health Risks After Flint Water Tests
Revealed Too Much Disinfection Byproduct, MLIVE (Jan. 2, 2015, 9:09 PM), http://www
.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/flint_water_has_high_disinfect.html
(reflecting growing concerns over total trihalomethane levels (TTML) in water
supply).
40. See Disaster Day by Day: A Detailed Flint Crisis Timeline, BRIDGE MAGAZINE
(Mar. 1, 2016), http://bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-crisis-timeline-part-2/ (high-
lighting email from MDEQ employee to colleagues regarding lack of public confi-
dence in drinking water safety).
41. See Jonathan Oosting, Legionnaires’ Fear Led Staffer to Warn Against Calling
Water Safe, THE DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 26, 2016, 12:07 AM), http://www.detroitnews
.com/story/news/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/02/26/flint-legionnaires-safe-
water-wyant-snyder/80966744/ (analyzing released emails indicating official at-
tempts to downplay potential public safety concerns regarding Flint River water).
42. Legionella (Legionnaires’ Disease and Pontiac Fever): Signs and Symptoms, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/legionella/about/
signs-symptoms.html (last updated July 18, 2016) (describing signs and symptoms
of diseases related to Legionella bacteria).
43. Legionella (Legionnaires’ Disease and Pontiac Fever): Causes, How it Spreads, and
People at Increased Risk, CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www
.cdc.gov/legionella/about/causes-transmission.html (last updated June 1, 2017)
6
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol29/iss1/2
2018] THERE’S SOMETHING IN THE WATER 63
disease occurred throughout the crisis, resulting in nine deaths and
universal outrage regarding the state’s failure to intervene or re-
quest aid from the CDC.44
Throughout these and later instances of public endangerment,
Flint’s state-appointed emergency managers and other officials fo-
cused primarily on the financial cost of changing from the Flint
River and their ability to hit the bare minimum of compliance with
water regulations.45  The city turned down an offer from Detroit to
reconnect with its water system, despite a waiver of the four million
dollar reconnection fee.46  In March 2015, the emergency manager
overruled a city council vote electing to reconnect with Detroit’s
water supply, calling the council’s vote “incomprehensible.”47
This course of conduct continued well into the fall of 2015,
with Flint and state officials’ continued insistence that Flint’s water
met applicable EPA regulations, and was therefore safe.48  Some of
the state officials’ most egregious instances of misconduct and fail-
ure came to light during this period, finally leading to publication
of both Virginia Tech’s and Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s findings.49  State
officials did not publicly admit that Flint’s water was not safe to
drink until October 2015, after inquiries such as the Virginia Tech
Study revealed that water from Flint River was nineteen times more
corrosive than water provided by the DWSD.50  The study’s prelimi-
(detailing ways in which Legionella bacteria transmits to humans); see also Legion-
ella (Legionnaires’ Disease and Pontiac Fever): Prevention, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/legionella/about/prevention.html (last
updated June 7, 2016) (noting complications relating to bacteria in warm water).
44. See Oosting, supra note 41 (noting CDC intervention may have lessened
severity of outbreaks and saved lives).
45. See Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 8, at 40, 44 (finding Flint
emergency managers gave little consideration to changing water sources despite
public demands to do so).
46. See Ron Fonger, Detroit Offers Flint ‘Long-Term’ Deal for Lake Huron Water
with No Reconnection Fee, MLIVE (Jan. 16, 2015, 5:51 PM), http://www.mlive.com/
news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/detroit_offers_flint_deal_for.html (noting tension
between state officials’ cost of reconnection concerns and citizens’ water quality
concerns).
47. See Ron Fonger, Emergency Manager Calls City Council’s Flint River Vote ‘In-
comprehensible,’ MLIVE (Mar. 24, 2015, 1:35 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/
flint/index.ssf/2015/03/flint_emergency_manager_calls.html (citing costs of
reconnection as motivating emergency manager’s veto decision).
48. See Water Quality Update, CITY OF FLINT (July 1, 2015), https://www.cityof-
flint.com/wp-content/uploads/July-2015-Letter-to-Water-Customers.pdf (assuring
safety and compliance of Flint water).
49. For a detailed inspection of state misconduct during the Flint water crisis,
see infra notes 95-152 and accompanying text.
50. See Dr. Marc Edwards, Test Update: Flint River Water 19x More Corrosive than
Detroit Water for Lead Solder; Now What?, VA. TECH. FLINT WATER STUDY (Sept. 11,
2015), http://flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/test-update-flint-river-water-19x-more-
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nary findings suggested that a large portion of Flint homes were
exposed to high levels of lead contamination.51  Soon thereafter,
Flint officially reconnected to Detroit’s water system, but not before
almost a year and a half of silence and downplaying of the extent of
lead exposure by state officials.52  Advisories to only drink from
filtered or bottled water still remain in place.53  The extent of lead
exposure’s effects on the population will not be fully known for
years, especially given the long-term nature of lead exposure’s im-
pact on children.54
III. HOW MUCH POISON IS TOO MUCH? THE LEAD AND COPPER
RULE AND THE “ACTIONABLE” LEVELS OF LEAD
A. The Safe Drinking Water Act
Congress enacted the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) in
1974, charging the EPA to establish national health-based standards
for drinking water, and to prevent contaminants in drinking water,
whether man-made or naturally occurring.55  Congress subse-
quently amended the Act twice, first in 1986 and again in 1996.56
Although the SDWA’s original purpose focused on the safety of
water at the tap, the later amendments significantly expanded the
corrosive-than-detroit-water-for-lead-solder-now-what/ (compiling findings from
various studies on Flint’s poor water quality).
51. See Dr. Marc Edwards, Our Sampling of 252 Homes Demonstrates a High Lead
in Water Risk: Flint Should be Failing to Meet the EPA Lead and Copper Rule, VA. TECH.
FLINT WATER STUDY (Sept. 8, 2015), http://flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/our-sam-
pling-of-252-homes-demonstrates-a-high-lead-in-water-risk-flint-should-be-failing-to-
meet-the-epa-lead-and-copper-rule/ (announcing study results which contradicted
official statements claiming to be in compliance with EPA regulations).
52. See Amanda Emery, Flint Reconnects to Detroit Water, May Take 3 Weeks to
Clear All Pipes, MLIVE (Oct. 16, 2015, 6:08 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/
index.ssf/2015/10/flint_reconnecting_to_detroit.html (noting additional efforts
required to minimize damage).
53. Jason Hanna, Flint Water Crisis: Deliver Bottles to Homes, Judge Rules, CNN
(Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/11/health/michigan-flint-water-
crisis/ (discussing federal court order).
54. See Gupta, Tinker & Hume, supra note 9 (discussing health impacts of
lead and multi-disciplinary care required to treat and minimize exposure side ef-
fects).  For further discussion of lead’s effects on human health, see supra notes 12-
15 and accompanying text.
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 300f (2015) (defining applicable terms in act, including
maximum contaminant level); see also Summary of the Safe Drinking Water Act, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-safe-drink-
ing-water-act (last updated Aug. 24, 2017) (introducing statute’s history and
purpose).
56. Office of Water, Understanding the Safe Drinking Water Act, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-F-04-030 (June 2004), https://www.epa.gov/sites/produc-
tion/files/2015-04/documents/epa816f04030.pdf (describing legislative history of
SDWA amendments).
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scope of the regulation, targeting areas such as source water protec-
tion, water system improvements, as well as funding for public in-
formation initiatives.57  Lead is, of course, a contaminant regulated
by the EPA under the SDWA.58
The SDWA banned any new installation of lead pipes in public
water systems and in residential housing after June 19, 1986.59  In
regards to what does not qualify as a “lead pipe,” construction
materials are deemed “lead free” if their solder and flux do not
contain more than 0.2 percent of lead and the “wetted surfaces of
pipes, pipe fittings, plumbing fittings, and fixtures” contain less
than 0.25 percent of lead.60  This ban does not, however, extend to
lead materials for other services, “such as manufacturing, industrial
processing, irrigation, outdoor watering, or any other uses where
the water is not anticipated to be used for human
consumption[.]”61
Pertinently, the SDWA specifically requires notices to be given
to individuals potentially affected by lead contamination, when con-
struction materials included in their public water distribution sys-
tem contain any lead and, if so, how much.62  Further, public notice
requirements also demand the public water system to identify
whether the “[c]orrosivity of the water supply [is] sufficient to
cause leaching of lead.”63  Such notices must include not only the
possible lead sources, but also any potential health impacts of the
contamination, mitigation methods reasonably available to the indi-
vidual consumers, as well as any possible need to seek a substitute
water supply.64
The EPA sets primary drinking water standards by first identify-
ing which contaminants pose a threat to public health and appear
57. Id. (noting expansion of SDWA’s scope and ability to regulate).
58. See Office of Water, Lead in Drinking Water Regulation: Public Education Gui-
dance, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-02-010, 3 (June 2002), https://nepis
.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10058E4.txt (explaining regulatory scheme
and public education methods).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-6(a)(1)(A) (2015) (declaring subsequent use of lead
pipes illegal).
60. Id. § 300g-6(d)(1)(A)-(B) (defining which pipes fall under regulation).
61. Id. § 300g-6(a)(4)(A) (excluding pipes used for services not related to
human consumption or use from regulation).
62. See id. § 300g-6(a)(2)(A) (detailing public notice requirements of SDWA).
63. Id. § 300g-6(a)(2)(A)(ii) (including water corrosivity in notice require-
ments).  Leaching refers to the process by which highly corrosive water extracts
elements such as lead from the pipe in which it is travelling. See Goodnough et al.,
infra note 96 (discussing leaching in Flint and its causes).  Leaching occurs after
the water leaves the water treatment facility, and is primarily combatted by adding
corrosion control treatment at the treatment facility prior to distribution. See id.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-6(a)(2)(B) (explaining notice requirements).
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with such frequency that they warrant regulation.65  Next, the EPA
sets a maximum contaminant goal level, which reflects the contami-
nation level that does not threaten expected health risks.66  Finally,
using treatment techniques and the available technology, a maxi-
mum contaminant level for each contaminant is established and
subsequently enforced by the EPA.67
B. The Lead and Copper Rule
The primary rule addressing lead levels in drinking water is 40
C.F.R. § 141.80, or The Lead and Copper Rule.68  The EPA’s stated
maximum contaminant level goal for lead levels is zero.69  This is
due to the disastrous effects of lead in the blood stream, which
“[make it] difficult to clearly identify what [exposure] level is an
appropriate criterion or ‘threshold’ below which there are no ad-
verse health effects.”70  As previously noted, although maximum
contaminant level goals are uniform, they are not enforceable.71
In 1991, the EPA initially identified three main reasons why
uniform lead decontaminant regulations would be ineffective.72
First, most lead poisoning occurs not from source water contamina-
tion, but from corrosive interaction with water and plumbing
materials after the water leaves the treatment center.73  Second, the
public water system cannot control privately-owned plumbing
materials, which make up a significant portion of current lead
plumbing.74  Finally, the first two factors cause lead levels in individ-
ual homes to vary greatly, making a uniform lead concentration dif-
65. See Maximum Contaminant Level Goals and National Primary Drinking
Water Regulations for Lead and Copper, 56 Fed. Reg. 26460, 26462 (June 7, 1991)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141, 142) (explaining process for regulating lead
and copper).
66. See id. at 26467 (discussing MCL for lead in water systems).
67. See id. at 26472 (explaining rationale for setting current MCL for lead in
water systems).
68. 40 C.F.R. § 141.80 (2007) (addressing permissible lead and copper levels
in drinking water).
69. See Maximum Contaminant Level Goals and National Primary Drinking
Water Regulations for Lead and Copper, 56 Fed. Reg. at 26463 (stating purpose
and goal of Lead and Copper Rule).
70. Id. at 26468 (explaining zero tolerance goal for lead blood levels).
71. See Understanding the Safe Drinking Water Act, supra note 56 (distinguishing
enforceability of maximum contaminant level goals) (emphasis added).
72. See Maximum Contaminant Level Goals and National Primary Drinking
Water Regulations for Lead and Copper, 56 Fed. Reg. at 26471 (explaining diffi-
culties of uniform regulatory regime).
73. See id. (noting lack of source water contamination with lead).
74. See id. (explaining ownership of lead plumbing and regulatory
limitations).
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ficult to maintain or enforce.75  These difficulties led to the current
regulatory regime.76
The Lead and Copper Rule targets lead contamination in four
principal ways: “[C]orrosion control treatment, source water treat-
ment, lead service line replacement, and public education.”77  All
water systems are required by law to install and operate corrosion
control treatment, which ensure that systems do not leach lead
while water travels from treatment centers to customers.78  When
enacted in 1991, the Lead and Copper Rule required water system
managers (hereinafter “water systems”) to conduct two initial six-
month monitoring periods to determine and designate the optimal
corrosion control treatments, which were to be installed by 1997
and reviewed by the state in 1998.79
States must adopt schedules and protocols for testing the water
supply at set intervals, depending on population size and risk of
exposure.80  A public water system exceeds the lead action level if
its concentration of lead is higher than .015 mg/L in “more than
[ten] percent of tap water samples collected during any monitoring
period . . . .”81  Crucially, the samples are meant to be collected
from areas and locations “that may be particularly susceptible to
high lead or copper concentrations.”82
If a water system exceeds the action levels, the source water
treatment requirements are triggered.83  A water system in this cir-
cumstance must make a treatment recommendation to the state
within 180 days of the failure.84  From there, the state either accepts
the water system’s recommended treatment or imposes a different
treatment.85  The four recognized methods for treating contami-
75. See id. (pointing to disproportionate amounts of lead at tap sources as
rationale for regulatory regime).
76. See id. (justifying lack of uniform tap regulations by pointing out practical
limitations to such regulations).
77. 40 C.F.R. § 141.80(b) (2007) (stating scope of Rule’s treatment
techniques).
78. See id. § 141.82 (requiring corrosion control treatment).
79. See id. § 141.81 (listing corrosion control treatment steps and deadlines
for large water systems).
80. See id. § 141.86 (setting forth guidelines for corrosion control treatments
for respective water system sizes).
81. Id. § 141.80 (establishing actionable level of lead contaminant in public
water systems).
82. 40 C.F.R. § 141.86 (2007) (providing considerations for determining
which homes are at highest risk).
83. Id. § 141.80 (explaining triggering event for source water treatment).
84. Id. § 141.83 (creating timeline for required recommendations to state).
85. Id. (noting state’s options for enforcing water treatment).
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nated source water are “ion exchange, reverse osmosis, lime soften-
ing or coagulation/filtration.”86
Pursuant to a 2007 amendment to the Lead and Copper Rule,
water systems must replace a minimum of seven percent of lead
lines in their distribution system annually.87  Moreover, whenever a
public water system exceeds the action level for lead, it must take
further actions to subsequently replace lead lines.88  If part of the
lead pipe is privately owned, the water system must make the owner
aware of the line’s existence and “offer to replace the owner’s por-
tion of the line.”89
Finally, the Lead and Copper Rule mandates that the water sys-
tem inform the public of failures to comply with the lead contami-
nation efforts.90  The “public education” section sets forth specific
requirements for the form, content, and scope of the public notifi-
cation.91  The notice’s first four factors have precise wording in-
structing the waters systems exactly how to inform the public of the
requisite information regarding their water’s elevated lead levels.92
The rule sets forth precise, standard language for the water system
to use in informing the customers on the presence of elevated
levels of lead, the health effects of lead, and contacts for additional
information.93  Further, the water system must provide information
86. Id. (allowing options for water source treatment).
87. 40 C.F.R. § 141.84 (2007) (setting initial requirements for lead service
pipe removal).
88. Id. (requiring expedited measures in event of failure to comply with ac-
tion level).
89. Id. (noting impact of private ownership on removal).
90. See id. § 141.85 (requiring consumer notice when lead levels in tap water
exceed action level).
91. See id. (noting specificity with which water systems are required to inform
consumers).
92. See 40 C.F.R. § 141.85 (a)(1)(i)-(iv) (2007) (setting explicit language re-
quirements for certain public disclosures).
93. Id. (stating areas requiring strict adherence to language of Lead and Cop-
per Rule).  The template public education materials include:
(i) IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT LEAD IN YOUR DRINKING
WATER. [INSERT NAME OF WATER SYSTEM] found elevated levels of
lead in drinking water in some homes/buildings. Lead can cause serious
health problems, especially for pregnant women and young children.
Please read this information closely to see what you can do to reduce lead
in your drinking water.
(ii) Health effects of lead. Lead can cause serious health problems if too
much enters your body from drinking water or other sources. It can cause
damage to the brain and kidneys, and can interfere with the production
of red blood cells that carry oxygen to all parts of your body. The greatest
risk of lead exposure is to infants, young children, and pregnant women.
Scientists have linked the effects of lead on the brain with lowered IQ in
children. Adults with kidney problems and high blood pressure can be
12
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on the sources of lead, ways for consumers to reduce their exposure
to lead, and an explanation for the elevated levels of lead.94
IV. AIMING FOR THE LOWEST BAR POSSIBLE
AND COMING UP SHORT
A. Failures in Enforcing the Law
The Flint Water Treatment Plant, acting under the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality’s (MDEQ) recommenda-
tions, failed to provide corrosion control treatment.95  While Flint
purchased water from DWSD, the water came treated with a com-
pound designed to prevent lead and copper leaching into the water
supply.96  After the switch, however, no such corrosion control
treatment was added despite the river’s notoriety for being less safe
than the DWSD water supply.97  MDEQ did not recommend any
such treatment because according to MDEQ’s interpretation of the
Lead and Copper Rule, no treatment was required until after two
consecutive six-month monitoring periods passed.98
Even worse, MDEQ’s water sample collection procedure made
it substantially less likely to obtain an accurate report.99  The state
instructed residents to “pre-flush” and failed to sample the areas
affected by low levels of lead more than healthy adults. Lead is stored in
the bones, and it can be released later in life. During pregnancy, the
child receives lead from the mother’s bones, which may affect brain
development.
. . . .
(vi) For more information, call us at [INSERT YOUR NUMBER] [(IF
APPLICABLE), or visit our Web Site at [INSERT YOUR WEB SITE
HERE]]. For more information on reducing lead exposure around your
home/building and the health effects of lead, visit EPA’s web site at http:/
/www.epa.gov/lead or contact your health care provider.
40 C.F.R. § 141.85(a)(1)(i)-(ii), (vi).
94. See 40 C.F.R. § 141.85(a)(1)(iii)-(v) (identifying areas which, although re-
quired, can be explained in water systems’ own words).
95. See Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 8, at 27-28 (noting lack of
corrosion control required at time of transition).
96. See Abby Goodnough, Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Fouled Water and
Failed Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2016, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/
24/us/when-the-water-turned-brown.html?_r=0 (identifying that Detroit treated its
water with orthophosphate, which prevents corrosion in water supply).
97. Id. (comparing Flint’s corrosion control before and after switching water
sources).
98. See Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 8, at 28 (explaining depart-
ment’s choice not to require corrosion control treatment).  The Task Force deter-
mined that 1) MDEQ’s interpretation of the text of the Lead and Copper Rule was
erroneous, and 2) MDEQ failed to promptly require corrosion control even under
its own misinterpretation. Id.
99. See id. at 29, 44 (describing MDEQ’s sample collection process as “funda-
mentally flawed”).
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most likely to be affected by lead contamination.100  Pre-flushing
involves residents running tap water for a short period before col-
lecting the sample, which clears much of the built-up lead residue
in the faucet and pipes before the sample is collected.101
This made test results, such as those from the Walters’ home,
even more concerning because the actual lead levels were presuma-
bly even more astronomical.102  Although pre-flushing is not pro-
hibited by federal regulations, it reduces the accuracy of the lead
assessment and allows for serious health issues to potentially go ig-
nored.103  This procedure goes directly against the Lead and Cop-
per Rule’s stated purpose, which is to gauge the lead level at its
worst in the areas most likely to be affected by lead exposure.104
Beyond the state’s initial failure to comply with the Lead and
Copper Rule, commentators described their response to the com-
munity’s cries for help and action as disinterested and full of
scorn.105  Such disinterest is demonstrated in the state’s defensive
response to Dr. Hannah-Attisha’s findings, which were categorically
denied.106  Similarly incredulous was MDEQ’s insistence that the
amount of lead in Lee-Anne Walters’ water was due to non-existent
lead pipes.107  The lack of action following Ms. Walters’ complaint
is particularly shocking given Miguel Del Toral’s memo, which not
only highlighted the abnormally high lead levels, but prophetically
raised concerns about MDEQ’s pre-flushing protocol and its possi-
ble implications for lead level results across the city.108
Due to severe public pressure, Governor Rick Snyder released
thousands of emails related to the Flint Water Crisis that contained
surprising revelations.109  One email from September 2015, de-
100. See Del Toral, supra note 1, at 2-3 (highlighting pre-flushing procedure
and its potential impact).
101. Id. (explaining pre-flushing process and its implications).
102. Id. (noting gravity of Ms. Walters’ situation and MDEQ’s impact).
103. Id. (expressing concern pre-flushing affects accuracy of monitoring
sample).
104. Id. (noting practice’s counterintuitive nature, despite its legality).
105. See Julie Bosman, Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, As Water Problems Grew,
Officials Belittled Complaints from Flint, N.Y. TIMES A1 (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www
.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/us/flint-michigan-lead-water-crisis.html (describing ap-
athetic response to community outcry).
106. See Gupta, Tinker & Hume, supra note 9 (noting state’s denial of doctor’s
research findings).
107. Del Toral, supra note 1, at 3 (contradicting state’s assertions of lead pip-
ing in Ms. Walters’ home).
108. Id. (suggesting that poor monitoring could cause significant lead
exposure).
109. See Jim Lynch, Chad Livengood & Jonathan Oosting, Snyder Emails Detail
State’s Missteps in Flint Crisis, THE DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 20, 2016, 12:23 PM), http://
14
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scribed a state official’s belief that the Flint community was turning
children’s lead exposure into “a political football.”110  Many of the
emails focused more heavily on suppressing potentially bad news
and only addressed the economic impact of Flint’s crisis, rather
than the health concerns.111
For instance, state officials were very dismissive of any potential
ties between the change in water supply and an increase in Legion-
naires’ disease.112  Since June 2014, eighty-seven cases of Legion-
naires’ disease surfaced in Genesee County.113  This uptick in
outbreaks corresponded conspicuously with the switch to the Flint
River water.114  Although one supervisor at the Genesee County
Health Department (GCHD) described the outbreak as a “signifi-
cant and urgent public health issue,” it received little attention
from state officials.115  The acting MDEQ communications director
at the time suggested that without concrete proof, raising even a
suspicion of such a correlation was “beyond irresponsible.”116  State
officials did little to investigate the GCHD official’s “leap” and
never informed the Governor of the possible link.117
B. Impartial Investigations
In late October 2015, Governor Snyder convened the Flint
Water Advisory Task Force (FWATF) to conduct an independent
investigation into the crisis as well as to suggest more protective
guidelines for the future.118  In its final report, issued in March of
www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/20/snyder-flint-emails/79062
418/ (covering release of emails and state leaders’ mistakes).
110. E-mail from Dennis Muchmore to Governor Rick Snyder & Brian Calley
(Sept. 25, 2015, 10:29 AM), http://somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/
snyder%20emails.pdf (characterizing public outcry as political mechanism).
111. See generally id. (focusing on cost of reconnection rather than impact on
public health).
112. See generally Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Emails Reveal Early Suspicions of
a Flint Link to Legionnaires’ Disease, N.Y. TIMES A17 (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www
.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/us/emails-reveal-early-suspicions-of-a-flint-link-to-le-
gionnaires-disease.html (noting emails suggested state awareness of problem).
113. Id. (stating amount of cases presented after switch to Flint River water).
114. Id. (commenting on timeline of outbreak in relation to water source
switch).
115. Id. (describing local official’s request for help and clarification).
116. Id. (quoting state official’s response to local concern over correlation).
117. Davey & Smith, supra note 112 (observing lack of executive action follow-
ing possibility of correlation).
118. Office of the Governor Rick Snyder, Gov. Rick Snyder Announces Flint
Water Task Force to Review State, Federal and Municipal Actions, Offer Recommendations,
MICHIGAN.GOV (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277-
57577_ 57657-367761—,00.html (announcing Task Force’s creation, purpose, and
members).
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2016, the FWATF described the Flint Water Crisis as “a story of gov-
ernment failure, intransigence, unpreparedness, delay, inaction,
and environmental injustice.”119  The FWATF assigned primary re-
sponsibility for the crisis to MDEQ, which suffered from “cultural
shortcomings” that caused the department to misinterpret and fail
to enforce the Lead and Copper Rule.120  As a result, lead levels in
Flint’s water went under-reported and ultimately, un-
investigated.121
The FWATF’s preliminary findings, released in December
2015, described the culture at MDEQ as one that aimed for “techni-
cal compliance” with the Lead and Copper Rule, regardless of the
practical consequences.122  This was especially apparent in MDEQ’s
decision not to require corrosion control treatment, an action that
ran counter to the purpose of minimizing health risks, and was later
justified with the vague language found in the regulations.123  Ad-
dressing the department’s reaction to citizen’s outcries, the Task
Force termed MDEQ’s response as dismissive, full of scorn, and
“more determined to discredit the work of others—who ultimately
proved to be right—than to pursue its own oversight
responsibility.”124
Similarly culpable in the eyes of the FWATF was the Michigan
Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS), the agency
that prematurely dismissed Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s research.125  The
FWATF noted this dismissal, along with a failure to evaluate and
appreciate its own research, resulted in leadership’s failure to pre-
vent childhood lead exposure.126  The FWATF also found MDEQ
119. See Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 8, at 1 (noting universal
nature of governmental failure).
120. Id. at 28 (critiquing and condemning MDEQ’s environmental failures).
121. Id. (noting ways in which MDEQ’s actions directly contributed to ele-
vated lead levels).  The report specifically identified the MDEQ’s Office of Drink-
ing Water and Municipal Assistance as the office primarily at fault. Id.
122. Letter from Flint Water Advisory Task Force to Governor Rick Snyder,
FLINT WATER STUDY (Dec. 29, 2015), http://flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/12/FWATF-Snyder-Letter-12-29-15.pdf (criticizing cultural short-
comings of MDEQ which improperly aimed for bare minimum compliance
practices).
123. Id. at 2-3 (reiterating regulatory purpose and spirit of Lead and Copper
Rule).
124. Id. (criticizing MDEQ’s reaction to citizen demands for transparency).
125. See Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 8, at 32 (mentioning Dr.
Hanna-Attisha and Virginia Tech’s findings, and MDHHS’ reaction).
126. Id. at 33 (noting MDHHS’ role of leadership in preventing lead expo-
sure and protecting children).
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and MDHHS did not adequately cooperate in their joint goals.127
“Communication was infrequent, and when it did occur, the default
position was to conclude that the health problems were not related
to the water supply switch . . . .”128
The FWATF’s findings noted that although the Governor’s Of-
fice’s knowledge was limited due to bad information disseminated
from MDEQ and MDHHS, there were also plenty of warning
signs.129  The FWATF highlighted an email between the Governor’s
executive staff suggesting that Flint switch back to DWSD’s water as
early as October 2014.130  This email alone “should have resulted, at
a minimum, in a full and comprehensive review of the water situa-
tion in Flint, similar to that which accompanied the earlier decision
to switch to [the Karegnondi Water Authority].”131
As the source of the decision to switch to Flint River water, the
FWATF naturally questioned the soundness of the emergency man-
agers’ positions in Flint.132  Noting that they are first and foremost
financial decision makers, the FWATF highlighted the managers’
lack of “necessary expertise to manage non-financial aspects of mu-
nicipal government.”133  This led the FWATF to recommend future
emergency managers act not only in the best financial interest of
the community, but for the broader goal of public health and
safety.134  The report cited local authorities as being unprepared
and inadequate for the protection of the local population.135  The
FWATF noted, however, that Flint’s Public Works Department re-
lied, perhaps foolishly, upon improper guidance from MDEQ, and
was hindered by emergency manager rule.136
127. Id. at 34 (identifying departments’ shared responsibilities and failure to
collaborate thereon).
128. Id. (describing unwillingness to consider Flint River as source of health
concerns).
129. Id. at 38 (highlighting lack of adequate information).
130. See Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 8, at 38 (pointing to in-
stance of executive acknowledgment of problem).
131. Id. (questioning lack of response and reconsideration on Governor’s
behalf).
132. Id. at 40 (discussing impact of emergency managers on Flint Water
Crisis).
133. Id. at 41 (questioning appropriateness of emergency managers making
public health decisions).
134. Id. at 42 (suggesting alternative arrangement for Emergency Manager
pro-visions).
135. See Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 8, at 44-45 (considering
impact of local authorities’ misunderstanding of law, procrastination, and lack of
expertise).
136. Id. (noting impact of emergency managers on local autonomy).
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Finally, the FWATF’s analysis of the crisis confronted the issue
of environmental injustice.137  Noting the population’s race and so-
cioeconomic status, the FWATF concluded that the population of
Flint “did not enjoy the same degree of protection from environ-
mental and health hazards as that provided to other communi-
ties.”138  Further, they noted that “Flint residents were not provided
equal access to, and meaningful involvement in, the government
decision-making process” due to the authority of the emergency
managers.139  Echoing these statements, the Michigan Civil Rights
Commission issued a report contextualizing the injustice of the
water crisis with decades of structural inequality between races in
Flint and issues of implicit bias in governmental decision-making.140
C. Other Investigations
The EPA likewise conducted its own investigation into the ade-
quacy of the response to the Flint Water Crisis.141  The EPA Office
of the Inspector General (OIG) concluded that the EPA could have
independently intervened in the crisis as early as June 2015.142  Al-
though the EPA expressed concerns over jurisdictional authority in
June 2015, the OIG’s report noted the EPA has the authority to
take emergency action to protect the public when a state’s actions
are insufficient.143  The OIG report stated that once the EPA was
aware that no corrosion control was being administered, and that
several homes’ lead levels were above the action level of the Lead
137. See id. at 54 (highlighting non-discrimination and “meaningful public in-
volvement” of community).
138. Id. (discussing impact of social status on representation and efficiency).
139. Id. (pointing to limitations on community’s access to public influence
and decision-making).
140. See generally The Flint Water Crisis: Systemic Racism Through the Lens of Flint,
MICH. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.michigan.gov/docu-
ments/mdcr/VFlintCrisisRep-F-Edited3-13-17_554317_7.pdf (addressing Flint
Water Crisis while recognizing historic socio-economic struggles of Flint’s re-
sidents).  This Comment focuses on the specific legal and environmental short-
comings that resulted in the water crisis, and thus did not address racial injustice,
which is all too crucial to understand the Crisis’ importance from a socio-economic
and cultural perspective.
141. See Office of Inspector General, Protecting America’s Waters Management
Alert: Drinking Water Contamination in Flint, Michigan, Demonstrates a Need to Clarify
EPA Authority to Issue Emergency Orders to Protect the Public, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY
(Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-10/docu-
ments/_epaoig_20161020-17-p-0004.pdf (investigating EPA’s role in prolonging
Flint Water Crisis).
142. See id. at 4 (identifying time at which EPA had sufficient information to
intervene).
143. Id. at 5 (explaining legal basis for EPA emergency authority).
18
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol29/iss1/2
2018] THERE’S SOMETHING IN THE WATER 75
and Copper Rule, it was authorized to intervene.144  This hesitancy
prolonged the public health dangers and the people of Flint’s
suffering.145
There have been approximately thirteen criminal cases filed
against state and local officials related to the crisis.146  Michigan’s
Attorney General announced the first three in April 2016, charging
two former MDEQ employees as well as a Flint water plant opera-
tor.147  That July, three more MDEQ officials were charged as well
as three MDHHS employees.148  Five months later, two former
emergency managers, a former Flint utilities administrator, and a
former Flint Public Works director were charged with various of-
fenses.149  Finally, MDHHS Director Nick Lyon and four other indi-
viduals were charged with involuntary manslaughter in connection
with their failures to protect the people of Flint.150  Multiple private
lawsuits have been filed as well.151  These include individual and
class action suits filed against the state, officials, as well as the EPA,
seeking damages and specific performance in the form of lead line
replacement.152
144. Id. (noting events after which EPA had sufficient cause to act).
145. Id. at 5-6 (stating lack of action prolonged public health risks).
146. For a discussion of the various criminal claims brought against officials,
see infra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
147. See Amanda Emery, Two State DEQ Workers Arraigned on Criminal Charges in
Flint Water Crisis, MLIVE (Apr. 20, 2016, 4:52 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/
flint/index.ssf/2016/04/two_state_employees_arraigned.html (detailing arraign-
ments and case statuses).
148. See Dominic Adams, New Charges Announced in Flint Water Crisis, MLIVE
(July 29, 2016, 9:25 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/07/
new_charges_announced_in_flint.html (updating information on charges filed
against officials).
149. See Ron Fonger, Two Former Flint Emergency Managers Charged with Water
Crisis Crimes, MLIVE (Dec. 20, 2016, 9:51 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/
index.ssf/2016/12/former_state_emergency_manager.html (announcing recent
charges against former Flint officials).
150. See Vann R. Newkirk II, Five Involuntary Manslaughter Charges in the Flint
Water Crisis, THE ATLANTIC (June 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/06/an-involuntary-manslaughter-charge-in-the-flint-water-crisis/530
280 (describing Michigan Attorney General’s decision to charge high ranking offi-
cials in connection with Flint Water crisis).  The other four officials charged were
“former Flint Emergence Manager Darnell Earley, former state environmental offi-
cial Liane Shekter-Smith, former Flint Public Works director Howard Croft, and
state water supervisor Stephen Busch.” Id.
151. See 4 Families Sue Over Lead in Flint Water, THE DETROIT NEWS (Nov. 15,
2015, 10:39 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/
2015/11/15/flint-water-lawsuit/75851902/ (describing civil suits against state and
city officials).
152. See Gary Ridley, New Flint Water Lawsuit Seeks Replacement of Lead Service
Lines, MLIVE (Jan. 27, 2016, 10:07 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/in-
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V. HOLD ON TO YOUR WATER FILTERS KIDS,
THIS COULD TAKE AWHILE
A. Other Incidents in the U.S.
Unfortunately, the misinformation and reporting delays be-
hind Flint’s lead exposure are not isolated occurrences.153  Notable
instances of unreported and untreated elevated lead levels across
the country are indicative of a much larger problem.154  In the early
2000s, Washington, D.C.’s water supply contained lead levels much
higher than the acceptable limit.155  Most individuals found out
about the lead exposure when the CDC acknowledged the inaccu-
racy of earlier statements that claimed that no children were at risk
for lead poisoning.156
In February 2016, the water in Jackson, Mississippi, likewise
contained an unacceptable amount of lead.157  Although the city
received results of fifty-eight home samplings in July 2015, the Lead
and Copper Rule’s language allowed the city to avoid calculating
the percentage of lead exposure until the end of the compliance
period in January, almost six months later.158  In Sebring, Ohio, a
water treatment operator faced criminal charges in January 2016,
after “seven of [twenty] homes where the water is routinely tested
. . .” had levels of lead of twenty-one parts per billion.159  Similar to
dex.ssf/2016/01/new_flint_water_lawsuit_seeks.html (reporting on recent federal
suit).
153. Michael Wines & John Schwartz, Unsafe Lead Levels in Tap Water Not Lim-
ited to Flint, N.Y. TIMES A1 (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/09/
us/regulatory-gaps-leave-unsafe-lead-levels-in-water-nationwide.html?_r=0 (noting
instances of lead exposure outside of Flint).
154. See generally id. (describing several instances of lead exposure in past
decade).
155. See id. (recalling Washington, D.C. lead exposure).
156. See id. (noting lack of public notice in Washington, D.C. lead exposure
incident).
157. Anna Wolfe, Lead, Water: Still Questions in Jackson, THE CLARION LEDGER
(Feb. 3, 2016, 5:32 PM), http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/local/2016/
02/03/lead-water-still-questions-jackson/79760794/ (covering recent lead expo-
sure in Jackson).
158. See id. (noting delay in timeline of reporting requirements).  Step One of
the Lead and Copper Rule’s corrosion control adoption requirement states that
water systems will “conduct initial monitoring (§ 141.86(d)(1) and § 141.87(b))
during two consecutive six-month monitoring periods . . . .”  40 C.F.R.
§ 141.81(d)(1).
159. See Ohio Town May be the Next Flint with its Water Crisis, CBS NEWS (Jan. 25,
2016, 8:48 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/sebring-ohio-next-flint-water-cri-
sis-lead-copper/ (describing lead exposure incident leading to criminal
consequences).
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Flint, the residents of Sebring were not informed in a timely
manner.160
Many of these instances occurred due to unforeseen conse-
quences of chemicals added to the water supply, which were ini-
tially aimed at making it safer.161  Switching from chlorine to
chloramine contributed to the lead exposure in Washington,
D.C.162  In Maine, an anion exchange program designed to remove
arsenic from well water caused levels of lead to spike dramati-
cally.163  In Flint, heavy amounts of chlorine combatting bacteria
accelerated the amount of leaching already occurring.164
B. The Problem with the Current System
The Lead and Copper Rule leaves too many possibilities for
inaccurate sampling, such as “failure to pick the worst-case houses,
[and] not allowing water to stand long enough before sampling
. . .” being just a couple.165  Further, systems whose sample results
could come dangerously close to the action level and still be
deemed within compliance.166  Effectively, a sampling could have
nine percent of the homes reporting “hazardous levels of lead . . .”
and still be in full compliance with EPA regulations.167
Error margins such as these led some to argue that current
lead monitoring efforts are “‘focused on how to achieve a passing
score, not how to inform the public and to truly and effectively ad-
dress the underlying problem of lead levels in drinking water.’”168
160. Id. (addressing local official’s failure to provide adequate testing or no-
tice to consumers).  A spokesperson for the Ohio Environmental Protection
Agency stated of Sebring’s Water Superintendent that “incomplete data time and
time again, and not submitting the required documents, made it difficult for our
field office to determine whether or not they had notified their customers.” Id.
For a further discussion of the lack of transparency between water authorities and
the people of Flint, see supra notes 34-48, and accompanying text.
161. See Wines & Schwartz, supra note 153 (describing effects of added chemi-
cals on New Jersey town’s lead supply).
162. Rebecca Renner, Out of Plumb: When Water Treatment Causes Lead Contami-
nation, 117 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES A 542, A 544 (Dec. 2009), https://www
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2799485/pdf/ehp-117-a542.pdf (discussing
cause of Washington, D.C. lead exposure from 2001-2003).
163. Id. (exploring unintended consequences of chemical additives on drink-
ing water).
164. See Fonger, supra note 33 (describing how increased chlorine levels led
to increased corrosion levels).
165. Renner, supra note 162, at A 546 (listing ways in which lead sampling can
be misleading).
166. See id. (discussing shortcomings of actionable levels of lead).
167. Id. (postulating worst case scenarios for incompetent lead sampling).
168. Id. at A 547 (quoting Washington, D.C. water official deflecting blame
for lead exposure to incompetency of Lead and Copper Rule).
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Critics of the current system are calling for increased transparency
in the absence of a more cohesive monitoring system; the State of
North Carolina petitioned the federal government to adopt a re-
quirement to report any excessive lead results to the consumer
within forty-eight hours.169  In October 2016, the EPA released a
White Paper describing revisions to the Lead and Copper Rule
under consideration, citing the crises in Flint and Washington as
examples of the need for an “overhaul” of the current regulatory
regime.170  Among its stated goals were more transparency, clearer
rules that are easier to enforce, and a “focus on minimizing” the
amount of lead in drinking water.171
Addressing the complexities of lead service line replacement,
the EPA stated that it is attempting to work around the problems
associated with requiring full lead service line replacement across
the country.172  The national estimated costs range anywhere from
sixteen to eighty billion dollars, and the legal intricacies of privately
owned lead service lines still remain.173  The White Paper also sug-
gests that the EPA update the corrosion control treatment guide-
lines every six years and for states to subsequently adapt to these
updates, ensuring the most up to date scientific practices are uti-
lized to guarantee the water supply’s safety.174  Another proposal
includes making corrosion control treatment an assumed require-
ment: “Requiring all systems to assume that their distribution sys-
tem includes the presence of [Lead Service Lines] . . .” or
affirmatively disprove that fact to the EPA.175
The White Paper acknowledged that the current sampling re-
quirements “were designed to assess the adequacy of [corrosion
control treatment], not the level of human exposure to lead,” and
169. State Demands Federal Rule Changes in Response to Flint Water Crisis, N.C.
DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY (Mar. 24, 2016), https://deq.nc.gov/press-release/state-
demands-federal-rule-changes-response-flint-water-crisis (responding to lack of
public notice in Flint, Michigan).
170. Office of Water, Lead and Copper Rule Revisions White Paper, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY 3 (Oct. 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
10/documents/508_lcr_revisions_white_paper_final_10.26.16.pdf (announcing
potential revisions to Lead and Copper Rule).
171. Id. at 4 (framing stated goals of proposed revisions).
172. Id. at 9-10 (addressing difficulties with requiring complete lead service
line replacement).
173. Id. (computing cost of complete lead replacement nationally).
174. Id. at 11 (recommending increased vigilance for sufficiency of corrosion
control treatment regimes).
175. See White Paper, supra note 170, at 8-11 (suggesting improvements for lead
service line replacement efficiency).
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should be abrogated for a more health-based standard.176  Further,
the White Paper frankly addressed the need for more transparent
sampling and information sharing, with a focus on taking steps to
accurately determine lead levels and keep the public informed
about them.177  Highlighting the wrongdoing in Flint, the EPA
noted that it released a memorandum to state agencies to discour-
age the use of procedures such as pre-flushing or removing faucet
aerators, both mistakes made by MDEQ.178
Finally, the White Paper confronted the shortcomings of cur-
rent public education requirements.179  Their recommended im-
provements included specific outreach to customers with lead
service lines, public access for anyone to the lead service line inven-
tory, as well as a more thorough notification system of irregularities
and individual measures.180  Although the White Paper’s thought-
ful solutions suggest that the EPA is aware of the Lead and Copper
Rule’s deficiencies, these policies have yet to be enacted.181
C. Flint Moving Forward
Meanwhile, the people of Flint remain at risk for lead expo-
sure.182  Although the lead contamination dropped significantly af-
ter the city resumed purchasing water from Detroit, the city is still
recommending residents only drink filtered or bottled water.183  In
addition to the state distributing filters and bottles at distribution
points, Federal District Court Judge David Lawson issued a ruling in
November 2016 requiring the state to deliver bottled water to
homes that do not have verified working filters.184  The results of
MDEQ’s July to December 2016 sampling period demonstrated that
ninety percent of the samples taken contained twelve parts per bil-
lion or less of lead, officially falling below the action level.185  The
176. Id. at 11, 17 (discussing overarching issues with lead regulation).
177. See generally id. at 12-15 (confronting need for updated sampling
procedures).
178. Id. at 13 (drawing on failures of Flint sampling administration).
179. Id. at 15-16 (commenting on potential improvements to public educa-
tion materials on lead).
180. White Paper, supra note 170, at 15-16 (suggesting improvements to public
education requirements).
181. See id. at 18 (noting that EPA is considering these changes).
182. See Hanna, supra note 53 (reporting on court ruling amid continued
public health concerns).
183. Id. (discussing current water policies of Flint, Michigan).
184. Id. (describing court ruling due to difficulties with distribution center).
185. Steve Almasy, Flint Water Lead Amounts Improve, Below Federal Limits, CNN
(Jan. 25, 2017, 5:50 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/24/health/flint-water-
crisis/index.html (announcing recent sampling results).
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new sampling results did not, however, change the recommenda-
tion that residents use filtered water for drinking and cooking.186
On March 17, 2017, the EPA awarded a $100 million grant to
MDEQ to aid water infrastructure upgrades in Flint.187  Addition-
ally, on March 28, 2017, District Judge Lawson approved an eighty-
seven million dollar settlement.188  The settlement agreement re-
quired that the lead pipes be replaced at a rate of approximately six
thousand per year, with a total replacement goal by January
2020.189  Further, the settlement required continued access to clean
water, filters, and filter education specialists.190
The state will also continue to cover pregnant women and chil-
dren under twenty-one under Medicaid up to four hundred per-
cent over the poverty line through March 2021, as well as providing
“case management services, for children with elevated blood levels
. . .” through September 2018.191  Notwithstanding these victories,
health implications of the crisis will not be fully understood for
years, and it is unclear whether the people of Flint’s trust in their
government can ever be regained.192
Kyle J. Conway*
186. Id. (noting continued need for water precautions).
187. EPA Awards $100 Million to Michigan for Flint Water Infrastructure Upgrades,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/
epa-awards-100-million-michigan-flint-water-infrastructure-upgrades (announcing
federal award for infrastructure repairs).
188. Tresa Baldas & Paul Egan, Judge Approves $87 Million Settlement in Flint
Water Lawsuit, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Mar. 28, 2017, 1:26 PM), http://www.freep
.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2017/03/28/judge-flint-water-
lawsuit-settlement/99731876/ (announcing approval of settlement requiring lead
service line replacement).
189. Id. (enumerating lead service line schedule and requirements).
190. Id. (noting additional state requirements of water resources under ap-
proved settlement).
191. Id. (discussing settlement requirement for continued medical coverage
and treatment).
192. See Jim Lynch, Flint Water Town Hall Leaves Residents Discouraged, THE DE-
TROIT NEWS (Jan. 11, 2017, 10:54 AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/
michigan/flint-water-crisis/2017/01/11/flint-water/96441578/ (emphasizing con-
tinued lack of trust in officials).
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
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